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Changing the Immutable 
SUSAN R. SCHMEISER 
Over the past few decades, questions about the chosen or compelled 
nature of sexual orientation have become both a political and a 
constitutional litmus test for progressive approaches to LGBT rights.   
While choice occupies a hallowed place in American culture, its invocation 
in the context of sexual orientation generally has a more ambivalent, and 
often sinister, ring.  High-profile gaffes by prominent politicians make 
clear that, in this context at least, pro-gay does not mean pro-choice.  This 
Article illuminates the rhetorical confusion surrounding homosexuality 
and choice, linking it to a misguided jurisprudence of immutability.  It 
reflects briefly on the emergence and persistence of immutability as a 
factor in equal protection challenges to discriminatory legislation, 
suggesting that the focus on immutability represents an unnecessary 
departure from the core purpose of equal protection jurisprudence: to 
ensure that the government not apportion rights according to such 
illegitimate considerations as paranoia or a desire to subordinate an 
unpopular group.  The Connecticut Supreme Court’s analysis of 
immutability in Kerrigan v. Department of Public Health, however, recasts 
the inquiry to focus on the social and legal ostracism that has defined gay 
identity for more than a century.  This propitious approach is primarily 
concerned with status as subordination (the new immutability) rather than 
status as essence (the old immutability). 
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Changing the Immutable 
SUSAN R. SCHMEISER∗ 
To be ‘gay,’ I think, is not to identify with the 
psychological traits and the visible masks of the homosexual, 
but to try to define and develop a way of life.  
-Michel Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life”1 
I.  CONFUSION AND THE POLITICS OF CHOICE 
In a nationally televised debate between Democratic presidential 
nominee John Kerry and Republican incumbent George W. Bush, 
moderator Bob Schieffer of CBS News posed a peculiar question to the 
candidates, one that would seem to have little relevance to presidential 
politics: “Do you believe homosexuality is a choice?”  President Bush 
equivocated, affirming his support for a constitutional amendment limiting 
marriage to heterosexual couples while professing “tolerance,” but Senator 
Kerry offered a more pointed response: 
We’re all God’s children, Bob. And I think if you were to 
talk to Dick Cheney’s daughter, who is a lesbian, she would 
tell you that she’s being who she was, she’s being who she 
was born as.  I think if you talk to anybody, it’s not choice. 
I’ve met people who struggled with this for years, people 
who were in a marriage because they were living a sort of 
convention, and they struggled with it.  And I’ve met wives 
who are supportive of their husbands or vice versa when they 
finally sort of broke out and allowed themselves to live who 
they were, who they felt God had made them.  I think we 
have to respect that.2 
Kerry’s “born-that-way” gesture of support for gay, lesbian and 
bisexual rights, however measured, took on the status of a calculated smear 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.  I extend hearty thanks to Chris Argyros, 
who provided superb research assistance, and to the many friends and colleagues who have indulged 
me over the years as I ranted against the politics of immutability.  I am also grateful to Jill Anderson for 
her deft interventions and to the editors of the Connecticut Law Review, particularly Krystyna 
Blakeslee, for their labor and patience. 
1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, Friendship as a Way of Life, in FOUCAULT LIVE (INTERVIEWS, 1966–84) 
204 (Sylvère Lotringer ed., John Johnston trans., 1989).  
2 Third Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate (CBS television broadcast Oct. 13, 2004) (transcript 
available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004d_p.html). 
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with his ad hominem invocation of a prominent Republican family to 
illustrate the putative nature of sexual orientation.  Whether slip or political 
strategy, Kerry’s mention of Mary Cheney, daughter of the sitting vice 
president and Bush’s running mate in the 2004 election, proved to be a 
costly indiscretion indeed.  These remarks precipitated such negative and 
inflammatory reactions that many campaign observers identified this 
exchange as a decisive moment in Kerry’s failed bid for president.3  
His evocation of Mary Cheney’s sexual orientation aside, Kerry’s 
response performs a series of associations that resonate strongly with 
arguments for LGBT rights.  In these remarks, Kerry juxtaposes the 
essential and God-given fact of homosexuality against the anguished 
performance of straight marriage, which has trapped men and women in 
lies until “they finally sort of broke out and allowed themselves to live who 
they were.”4  Thus marriage as compulsory heterosexuality requires gay 
men and lesbians to sacrifice truth to convention.  Hence, without 
expressing actual support for same-sex marriage—a position that few 
prominent figures in national politics have been willing thus far to take—
Kerry conveyed the coercive force of institutionalized heterosexuality to 
pervert the natural order of things.  In this account, nature, conceived here 
as divine creation, contravenes traditional morality; God’s morality 
therefore trumps the human morality that would incarcerate our true selves.  
At the time of this October 2004 exchange, calls for an amendment to 
the United States Constitution enshrining heterosexual marriage as an 
indelible component of American democracy and legal culture had reached 
a political crescendo.  Goodridge v. Department of Public Health5 made 
marriage newly available to same-sex couples in Massachusetts, while the 
Republican platform eagerly embraced the Federal Marriage Amendment.6 
With Vermont’s civil unions yielding to full marriage rights in 
Massachusetts and beyond,7 rhetoric surrounding the so-called “culture 
wars” posited threats to the traditional family as a greater menace to 
                                                                                                                          
3 See, e.g., Ron Hutcheson, Analysis: Many Bush Supporters Almost Voted for Kerry, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, Nov. 6, 2004, at 8A (“Kerry made a big mistake when he dragged Vice President Dick 
Cheney’s lesbian daughter into the third presidential debate, the studies showed.”).   
4 Third Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate, supra note 2. 
5 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003) (declaring exclusion of 
same-sex couples from state-sanctioned marriage a violation of the Massachusetts constitution).  
6 S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=f:sj40pcs.txt.pdf.  For discussion of the Federal 
Marriage Amendment’s history in Congress, see Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment 
and the False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 533–34 (2008); Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating Dangerous Constitutional Straits: A Prolegomenon on 
the Federal Marriage Amendment and the Disenfranchisement of Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 599, 599–601 (2005); Joan Schaffner, The Federal Marriage Amendment: To Protect the Sanctity 
of Marriage or Destroy Constitutional Democracy?, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 1487, 1487–90 (2005).    
7 Compare Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (recognizing same-sex unions), with 
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (recognizing full marriage rights). 
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American democracy than the battles roiling the Middle East and the 
ubiquitous threat of terrorism captured by the Department of Homeland 
Security’s color-coded threat alert.8     
By October 2008, when the Connecticut Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health granting full 
marriage rights to same-sex couples,9 another presidential election-cycle 
neared completion.  In the four years that had elapsed since Kerry incited 
outrage by identifying Cheney’s daughter as a lesbian, the question that 
elicited Kerry’s remark proved more tenacious than the proposed 
constitutional amendment itself, which last received serious consideration 
in 2006.10  For instance, when the Gallup News Service announced the 
results of its 2007 annual Values and Beliefs survey, the organization 
found support for gay rights approaching its highest level yet—a recovery 
from the backlash that surveys detected following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lawrence v. Texas.11 In its coverage of the survey results, 
Gallup emphasized that “Americans who believe homosexuals are born 
with their sexual orientation tend to be much more supportive of gay rights 
than are those who say homosexuality is due to upbringing and 
environment (and therefore, perhaps, more of a lifestyle choice).”12  If 
anything, the question of choice only gained more salience in political 
discourse and popular culture, where media accounts of scientific research 
on sexual orientation in human society as well as the animal world confer 
ongoing relevance and strong entertainment value on the subject.13   
                                                                                                                          
8 The color-coded threat alert system emerged under former President George W. Bush in a 2002 
Presidential Directive.  See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL 
DIRECTIVE 3 (2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214508631313.shtm#content 
(establishing the Homeland Security Advisory System, with five “Threat Conditions” identified by 
colors ranging from green, or  low threat, to red, or severe threat).  Same-sex marriage and other hot-
button cultural issues factored as prominently in the 2004 elections, surfacing not only in debates and 
campaign rhetoric but in ballot measures across the country adopting bans on same-sex marriage and 
marriage-like recognition in state constitutions and statutory codes.  Many commentators analyzed 
President Bush’s victory and other election results as signs of a political backlash precipitated by 
Goodridge and Lawrence v. Texas.  See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and 
Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 466–72 (2005) (documenting “the backlash ignited by the issue of 
same-sex marriage” in the 2004 elections).  
9 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008). 
10 See Colby, supra note 6, at 571 (describing the Amendment’s failure to gain the required two-
thirds majority in a House vote in 2006 and noting that the FMA was dropped from the legislative 
agenda when the Democrats gained control of Congress in the 2006 midterm elections).   
11 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (invalidating on due process grounds a Texas law 
that criminalized same-sex sodomy and overruling Bowers v. Hardwick). 
12 Lydia Saad, Tolerance for Gay Rights at High-Water Mark: Public Evenly Divided over 
Whether Homosexuality Is Morally Acceptable or Wrong, GALLUP NEWS SER., May 29, 2007, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/27694/Tolerance-Gay-Rights-HighWater-Mark.aspx.  
13 See, e.g., Dinitia Smith, Love That Dare Not Squeak its Name, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7 2004 
(documenting same-sex bonding and mating behavior among penguins); Deborah Solomon, Same-Sex 
Selection, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 9, 2004, at 17 (interviewing Stanford biology professor Joan 
Roughgarden, who claims that “if you ask any biologist, they can verify for you that they have either 
seen homosexuality in animals, or they know someone who has seen it, and never reported it”); James 
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Not surprisingly, the 2008 election saw its own controversies over the 
etiology of homosexuality.  During the primaries, Democratic candidate 
Bill Richardson, governor of New Mexico, committed a different sort of 
misstep in traversing the dangerous terrain of choice.  Prominent advocacy 
organization Human Rights Campaign partnered with gay-themed 
television channel Logo to host an event for presidential candidates 
focused on issues germane to the LGBT community.  (Since only the 
Democratic candidates agreed to participate in this event, the organizers 
staged a single forum.)  Singer Melissa Etheridge posed an apparent 
softball question to Governor Richardson, asking, “Do you think 
homosexuality is a choice, or is it biological?”  Heedless to cues prompting 
him toward the opposite conclusion, Richardson replied with alacrity, “It’s 
a choice.”  His answer provoked gasps and hisses from the audience and a 
puzzled follow-up from Etheridge, who suggested that Richardson might 
not have understood the question.  In subsequent remarks, Richardson 
declined to retract his answer, insisting instead that he was not a scientist 
and therefore preferred not to speculate on scientific explanations: “I see 
gays and lesbians as people, as a matter of human decency.  I see it as a 
matter of love and companionship and people loving each other.  I don’t 
like to categorize people.”14  Immediately following the event, though, 
Richardson’s campaign issued a statement negating the voluntarist account 
at work in his response.15 
In an interview the following day with a journalist representing an 
online publication, Richardson explained his apparent stumble, 
                                                                                                                          
Owen, Homosexual Activity Among Animals Stirs Debate, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, July 23, 2004, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/07/0722_040722_gayanimal.html (describing studies 
on the sexual habits of animals and their connection to human homosexuality); Steven Pinker, 
Editorial, Sniffing Out the Gay Gene, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at A21 (discussing a study which 
detailed the human brain’s response to chemical signals called pheromones in an attempt to learn more 
about human sexuality); Michael Abrams, Born Gay?, DISCOVER, June 2007, at 58, 60  (arguing that 
studies on the sexuality of men have proved that a male’s sexual orientation has a genetic cause and is 
not the result of an individual’s environment); Alice Park, What the Gay Brain Looks Like, TIME.COM, 
June 17, 2008, http://www.time. com/time/health/article/0,8599,1815538,00.html (indicating that the 
use of brain scans of men and women can determine what role brain size has in determining an 
individual’s sexuality); John Schwartz, Of Gay Sheep, Modern Science, and the Perils of Bad Publicity, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at A1 (describing the controversy surrounding research on sexual 
orientation in sheep).  
14 Quoted in CNN Politicalticker blog, Richardson flubs answer at gay forum, available at 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2007/08/10/richardson-flubs-answer-at-gay-forum/; see also 
Jonathan Capehart, Wrong Answer, Governor; The Democratic Calculus on Gay Rights Issues, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 13, 2007, at A11; Mike Dorning & Christi Parsons, Dems Walk Fine Line at GayIissues 
Forum; Rights Yes, Marriage No, Richardson Calls Orientation ‘A Choice,’ CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 
10, 2007 at C4. 
15 Richardson’s campaign ostensibly clarified the Governor’s position in an e-mail message 
distributed to reporters shortly after the event:  “I do not believe that sexual orientation or gender 
identity happen by choice.  But I’m not a scientist, and the point I was trying to make is that no matter 
how it happens, we are all equal and should be treated that way under the law.”  Ewen MacAskill, 
Democratic Candidates Tread Carefully at Gay Rights Forum, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 11, 2007, at 23; 
see also Capehart, Wrong Answer, Governor, supra note 14.    
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illuminating the lexical promiscuity of “choice” itself. 
Andrew Belonsky: Let’s start with “I’m not a scientist.”  
Of course you’re not.  You’re a governor.  What was going 
through your head when you stepped off the stage whether or 
not homosexuality is a choice? 
Bill Richardson: I immediately realized that I had to fix 
my statement.  I was confused by the question.  I just simply 
made a mistake.  I misunderstood the question.  My 
impression—I thought it was a tricky science question, where 
you put politics into science. I think the word Melissa used 
was “biological”.  Since I use “choice” so much, I’m so 
committed to choice—a woman’s right to choose—I thought 
that was the appropriate answer.16 
Although here and in subsequent coverage of this event Richardson blamed 
his confusion on fatigue, the account he provided to this interviewer 
supports a more complex explanation.  While liberal politicians celebrate 
“choice” in the context of reproductive freedom and various areas of 
individual and group rights, persuaded by feminism and other political 
movements to reject the notion of biology as destiny, the progressive 
endorsement of choice requires an abrupt reversal where voluntarism 
becomes a basis for censure and discrimination.  Another moment from the 
2008 campaign will further illustrate this paradox. 
Republican candidate Senator John McCain publicly opposed efforts to 
write heterosexual marriage into the United States Constitution, but his 
running mate, Governor Sarah Palin of Alaska, considered the matter 
suitable for constitutional intervention.  An amendment to the Alaska 
constitution limiting marriage to heterosexual couples, one of the first of its 
kind, gained passage a decade earlier in 1998; Palin indicated her support 
for a similar measure at the federal level.  In her much-lampooned 
television interview with CBS anchor Katie Couric, Governor Palin 
remarked: 
I have, one of my absolute best friends for the last 30 
years who happens to be gay.  And I love her dearly.  And 
she is not my “gay friend.”  She is one of my best friends 
who happens to have made a choice that isn’t a choice that I 
have made.  But I am not gonna judge people.  And I love 
America where we are more tolerant than other countries are.  
                                                                                                                          
16 Queerty.com, Richardson’s Gay “Choice”: What He Was Thinking, Where God Fits and How 
Hubert Humphrey Got Him Started, http://www.queerty.com/richardsons-gay-choice-20070810/ (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2009) (transcribing Queerty.com editor Andrew Belonsky’s August 10, 2007, 
interview with Governor Bill Richardson). 
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And are more accepting of some of these choices that 
sometimes people want to believe reflects solely on an 
individual’s values or not.  Homosexuality, I am not gonna 
judge people.17  
Her insistence to the contrary notwithstanding, Governor Palin’s comment 
deployed a some-of-my-best-friends-are-gay logic to convey a potentially 
less friendly message: that “being” gay is a matter of choice.  When 
Richardson suggested as much, he came off as bumbling and ill-prepared; 
indeed, his campaign issued a correction eschewing the choice argument 
within hours after the HRC event.18  When Palin espoused the language of 
choice, however, she cannily aligned herself with the conservative position 
on sexual orientation, understanding homosexuality as a matter of 
individual values and preferences that, while no longer punished explicitly 
in a pluralist democracy, do not warrant governmental endorsement.  Her 
rhetoric also resonates with discourses condemning same-sex eroticism as 
a deliberate rejection of civilized morality, an elevation of corporeal 
indulgence over spiritual devotion, and an embrace of self-gratification at 
the expense of family and community.  The rhetoric of choice thus 
performs significant ideological work in these exchanges, however 
incoherently.   
I recount these three incidents in an attempt to convey the high stakes 
surrounding the question of choice and to illuminate its oddly incendiary 
function in debates over homosexuality.  While choice and its conditions of 
possibility occupy a hallowed place in American culture and politics, its 
invocation in the context of sexual orientation generally has a more 
ambivalent, and often sinister, ring.  For several decades, the question of 
choice has polarized discussions of gay, lesbian and bisexual identities, 
communities, and practices.  Conservative opponents of LGBT rights tend 
to argue that homosexuality is nothing more nor less than a series of 
behavioral choices: choices to sin, to indulge, to flout the moral strictures 
essential to a stable and virtuous life, to elevate hedonistic interests over 
altruistic ones.19  Even without explicitly embracing a model of choice, 
                                                                                                                          
17 Katie Couric’s Interview of Sarah Palin and John McCain (Sept. 30, 2008) (transcript available 
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/30/eveningnews/main4490788_page3.shtml); see also 
Nathaniel Frank, Editorial, Gay Is a Choice? Not That Again; Palin’s View Ignores That, as in 
Religion, the Attraction is Undeniable, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at A23 (criticizing Palin’s responses). 
18 See MacAskill, supra note 15. 
19 In the words of one newspaper editor, “If you want to condemn gays to hell, it helps to believe 
they have chosen a ‘lifestyle’ based ‘simply on the premise of selfish hedonism,’ as Alan L. Keyes, the 
GOP candidate for Senate in Illinois, recently said of the Cheneys’ lesbian daughter, Mary.  For people 
such as Mr. Keyes, homosexuality has to be viewed as a choice.  Otherwise, it couldn’t be a sin.” 
Cynthia Tucker, No, It’s Not a Choice, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 25, 2004, at 15A.  One young 
conservative author is currently traveling to college and university campuses to lecture students on the 
“born gay hoax” in an effort to debunk popular theories of congenital homosexuality.  See Matt 
Maguire, Smith College Students Protest the ‘Born Gay Hoax,’ BAY WINDOWS, May 5, 2008; see also 
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some conservative commentators advance anti-gay arguments by noting 
the inconclusive evidence of biological determinism and exploiting the 
epistemological uncertainty surrounding the causes of sexual orientation.20 
Perhaps Governor Richardson’s alleged “confusion” around the function of 
choice in discussions of sexual orientation makes more sense when one 
learns that the president-elect of the National Association for the Research 
and Therapy of Homosexuality (“NARTH”), an organization devoted to  
“curing” homosexuality, recently announced to a crowd of therapists 
convened to discuss treatment methods: “When it comes to homosexuality, 
I’m pro-choice!”21  
With choice increasingly conscripted into the service of homophobic 
causes, it comes as little surprise that many pro-gay arguments wield 
determinism to counter discriminatory policies.   Advocates for LGBT 
rights have seized upon—and catalyzed—scientific research into the 
etiology of sexual orientation to contend that homosexuality has a basis in 
biology or is otherwise determined by factors outside of individual control 
yet essential to self-development.22 For instance, HRC distributes 
                                                                                                                          
Gary Greenberg, Gay By Choice? The Science of Sexual Identity, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 2007, at 
60 (describing the centrality of choice to anti-gay therapies seeking to convert patients to 
heterosexuality or celibacy); Exodus International, www.exodusinternational.org (last visited May 15, 
2009) (offering “freedom from homosexuality through the power of Jesus Christ”).        
20 In one recent example of this rhetorical strategy, a law professor and prolific critic of gay-
friendly family policies challenged immutability claims while advocating a shift in focus from the 
etiology of homosexuality to its putative health risks.  See Lynne D. Wardle, The Biological Causes 
and Consequences of Homosexual Behavior and Their Consequences for Family Law Policies, 56 
DEPAUL L. REV. 997, 1012–14 (2007) (arguing for the mutability of sexual attraction); id. at 1016 
(maintaining that, even if of unknown origin, homosexuality produces known risks).  Professor 
Wardle’s article represents a striking example of the extent to which opponents of LGBT rights exploit 
the manifold inconsistencies haunting accounts of sexual orientation predicated on genetic 
determinism.  Although I disagree strongly with Professor Wardle’s conclusions, I think he makes a 
powerful case against the spurious hunt for the “causes” of homosexuality and its role in organizing 
movements against discrimination on behalf of sexual minorities.   
21 Greenberg, Gay By Choice?, supra note 19, at 60.  NARTH was founded by psychiatrist 
Charles Socarides, the doctor who famously championed “reparative therapy” for gay patients and 
vigorously opposed the American Psychiatric Association’s 1973 decision to “delist” homosexuality 
from the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-II).  See 
id.; see also RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF 
DIAGNOSIS 115–38 (1986) (recounting events culminating in the deletion of homosexuality from the 
DSM-II).  
22 One of the strongest proponents of this position is writer Chandler Burr, author of A Separate 
Creation: The Search for the Biological Origins of Sexual Orientation (1996).  In a white paper written 
on behalf of the Log Cabin Republicans, an advocacy organization supporting gay and lesbian rights in 
conjunction with conservative policies, Burr declared provocatively that the question of choice, along 
with the scientific evidence debunking volitional theories of sexual orientation, is and should remain at 
the heart of debates over gay issues: “At its core, the answer to this question is the only one that 
matters, the one that determines the most appropriate public policy course, and the one that will win the 
political struggle over gay rights: Is homosexuality a lifestyle choice or is homosexuality an inborn 
biological trait?  Put another way, does someone choose to be gay or are they just born that way?”  
Chandler Burr, The Only Question that Matters: Do People Choose Their Sexual Orientation? LOG 
CABIN REPUBLICANS WHITE PAPER, June 2005, available at http://www.chandlerburr.com/articles/ 
Burr_White_Paper.html.   
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educational literature on issues affecting lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender people; a widely disseminated pamphlet devoted to “Coming 
Out” reassures its readers that “Your Sexuality or Gender Identity Is Not a 
Choice.  It Chooses You.”23 
Is homosexuality in fact a choice?  This deceptively facile question 
suffers from a confounding incoherence, including potentially 
incommensurable descriptive and normative implications.24  What 
referential parameters mark the subject (“homosexuality”) of such a 
question?  Does “homosexuality” refer to desires, fantasies, attractions, 
arousals, advances, nongenital contacts, or genital contacts directed toward 
same-gendered objects?  To what extent does this referent encompass self-
attribution, identification by others, or membership in a particular 
community?25  Is homosexuality the opposite of heterosexuality?  Does the 
category describe only human phenomena, or does it capture the activities 
and affective states of non-human animals?  And what of choice?  Is 
choice any exercise of “free will”?  Does “choice” require a process of 
selection, or merely an intentional act?  If a process of selection, then 
against what other options is homosexuality chosen? What conditions of 
possibility must obtain to enable choice: unfettered freedom, or merely the 
absence of coercion?  Is choice necessary for autonomy and self-
determination?  Such a simple question quickly dissolves into a conceptual 
muddle.      
Even if readers dismiss this inquiry as an exercise in sophistry, I hope 
to persuade them in the remainder of this Article that the question posed to 
Kerry, Richardson, and others should be put to rest in politics and 
jurisprudence alike.  In particular, I suggest that the potential mutability of 
sexual orientation lacks relevance to a reasoned analysis of whether laws 
that discriminate on this basis warrant heightened scrutiny.  Toward that 
end, I offer a condensed account below of the jurisprudential and political 
forces that elevated this question to a state of spurious magnitude.  Part II 
provides a brief introduction to the emergence and persistence of 
immutability as a factor in equal protection challenges to discriminatory 
legislation, suggesting that the focus on immutability represents an 
                                                                                                                          
23 HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, RESOURCE GUIDE TO COMING OUT FOR GAY, 
LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 11 (2004).  
24 See, e.g., EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 83–84 (1990) (“For 
surely, if paradoxically, it is the paranoid insistence with which the definitional barriers between ‘the 
homosexual’ [minority] and ‘the heterosexual’ [majority] are fortified, in this century, by 
nonhomosexuals, and especially by men against men, that most saps one’s ability to believe in ‘the 
homosexual’ as an unproblematically discrete category of persons.”). 
25 In her pioneering conceptualizations of queer theory, then only a burgeoning field, Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick brilliantly troubled the assumption that sexual identity constitutes a “unitary 
category,” noting in one essay that “what’s striking is the number and difference of the dimensions that 
‘sexual identity’ is supposed to organize into a seamless and univocal whole.”  EVE KOSOFSKY 
SEDGWICK, Queer and Now, in TENDENCIES 8 (1993). 
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unnecessary departure from the core purpose of equal protection 
jurisprudence: to ensure that the government not apportion rights, benefits 
and obligations according to such illegitimate considerations as paranoia or 
a desire to subordinate an unpopular group, and that its laws and policies 
not in fact enact such stratification.26  In other words, as the United States 
Supreme Court famously declared in Palmore v. Sidoti, “[p]rivate biases 
may be outside the reach of law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, 
give them effect.”27  
Part III turns to recent applications of immutability in cases 
challenging sexual orientation discrimination.  Within this jurisprudence, 
some courts find sexual orientation, and homosexuality in particular, 
insufficiently immutable to warrant judicial solicitude.  Other courts take a 
more permissive approach to immutability as a factor, deeming it relatively 
inconsequential to equal protection analysis and/or broadening its scope to 
include qualities central to personhood that may be resistant, if not entirely 
immune, to change.  Among these latter cases, I identify the Connecticut 
Supreme Court’s analysis of immutability in Kerrigan as a particularly 
welcome departure from the misplaced focus on the nature of group 
identity, specifically its conditions for entry and exit, in favor of an inquiry 
into the nature of discrimination and its pernicious effects. In its brief but 
compelling analysis of the immutability factor and, more generally, its 
application of heightened scrutiny to a marriage regime relegating gay men 
and lesbians to second-class status in their partnerships and families, the 
majority opinion deftly elucidates the perlocutionary force of legislative 
classifications.  Kerrigan exemplifies the role of judicial review as a 
bulwark against the ills of majoritarian democracy and its potentially 
tyrannical excesses, and thereby provides a means of graceful exit from the 
immutability morass in which equal protection analysis has become mired.  
With the decline of criminal sanctions for same-sex eroticism in Lawrence 
and beyond, there is no longer any jurisprudential reason to embrace a 
model of homosexuality as compulsive and ineluctable.    
Finally, in Part IV, I evoke a broader cultural and theoretical context 
for my contention that progressive arguments on behalf of sexual-
                                                                                                                          
26 As the Supreme Court has noted on several occasions, “If the constitutional conception of 
‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”  Department 
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1997) 
(striking down an amendment to the Colorado constitution that barred antidiscrimination measures on 
behalf of sexual minorities).  Thus mere animus will not survive even rational basis review.   In 
Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely observed famously that, “[f]or whatever else it may or may not 
be, prejudice is a lens that distorts reality.  We are a nation of minorities and our system thus depends 
on the ability and willingness of various groups to apprehend those overlapping interests that can bind 
them into a majority on a given issue; prejudice blinds us to overlapping interests that in fact exist.”  
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 54 (1980). 
27 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
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orientation minorities need not and must not cede choice and self-
determination to the realm of homophobia.  This Part offers a brief 
historical account of the development of a medico-legal discourse around 
homosexuality, with an eye toward the ways in which attributions of 
diminished will cast gay men and lesbians as incapable of full autonomy or 
democratic participation.  In light of this history and the jurisprudential 
incoherence that has plagued immutability, it seems essential to continue 
along Kerrigan’s path toward retiring the issue altogether. 
My purpose throughout this Article is neither to champion nor to 
debunk theories of biological or congenital immutability in the context of 
sexual orientation.28  Nor do I wish to propose an alternative conception of 
immutability in individual self-definition that would circumvent the 
difficulties of scientific proof in this area.29  A rich scholarly literature that 
first emerged some fifteen years ago has begun to accomplish all of these 
missions already.30  Instead, I perceive immutability as a constitutional red 
                                                                                                                          
28 For accounts supporting scientific research into sexual orientation and its origins, see generally 
TIMOTHY F. MURPHY, GAY SCIENCE, THE ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION RESEARCH Ch. 2 (1997) 
(The Value of Sexual Orientation Research) (arguing that the potential benefits of scientific research on 
sexual orientation outweigh its potential misuse); Kari Balog, Note, Equal Protection for Homosexuals: 
Why the Immutability Argument is Necessary and How it is Met, 53 CL. ST. L. REV. 545, 557–58 
(2005–2006) (“The plethora of scientific and medical research available on sexual orientation answers 
the question of immutability in the affirmative.  Homosexuals do not take a risk in invoking the 
immutability argument in equal protection claims because the medical and scientific research positively 
shows sexual orientation to be as immutable as gender.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive 
Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U.L. REV. 573, 583–90 (offering positive reviews of scientific research 
into the basis for sexual orientation).   
For critiques of the scientistic approach to immutability and equal protection, see EDWARD STEIN, 
THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION Ch. 10 
(1999) (Rights and the Science of Sexual Orientation); id. Ch. 12 (Should Scientific Research on Sexual 
Orientation Be Done?); JENNIFER TERRY, AN AMERICAN OBSESSION: SCIENCE, MEDICINE AND 
HOMOSEXUALITY IN MODERN SOCIETY (1999) (offering an historical account of scientific fascination 
with homosexuality as the abnormal other against which to measure the shifting bounds of the 
“normal”); id. at 394 (contending that arguments for the immutability of homosexuality betray a 
misreading of the scientific research). 
29 For recent proposals advancing conceptions of immutability that transcend the nature vs. 
nurture divide, see, for example, Shannon Gilreath, Of Fruit Flies and Men: Rethinking Immutability in 
Equal Protection Analysis—With a View Toward a Constitutional Moral Imperative, 9 J.L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 1, 31 (2006) (eschewing trait immutability as a basis for equal protection in favor of trait 
coercion where a trait such as homosexuality describes an essential aspect of individual identity); 
Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 650 (2001) (proposing a 
“new vision of immutability” that encompasses the social construction of identity).  Professor 
Marcosson in particular seeks to reinvigorate immutability, arguing that, “[p]roperly understood and 
argued, immutability has resonance both within and outside the legal sphere, and can be of particularly 
great force in winning the fifth for equality for sexual and gender minorities.”  Id. at 649.  Marcosson’s 
approach most closely resembles the one pursued by the majority in Kerrigan.  The focus on qualities 
central to personal identity found early expression in a Harvard Law Review Note, where the editors 
wrote: “An alternative view of the importance of immutability might . . . focus on the argument that the 
characteristics of race and sex are important not because they are (usually) determined at birth, but 
because they are such determinative features of personality.”  Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual 
Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1303 (1985). 
30 In a 1994 article routinely cited by scholars and courts alike (both supporting and challenging 
sexual orientation discrimination), Professor Janet Halley offered a trenchant critique of biological 
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herring, a perilous strategy for demanding civil rights,31 and a cultural 
side-show whose dramatic contrivances, evident in the incidents I relayed 
above, distract us from the real questions of liberty and equality that 
demand jurisprudential resolution.32 
II.  THE IMMUTABILITY MORASS  
In a story familiar to students of constitutional law, the Supreme Court 
opinion in United States v. Carolene Products (1938) famously gestured 
toward a “more searching judicial inquiry” in cases where legislation 
targeting unpopular groups reflects the sort of “prejudice against discrete 
and insular minorities” that also “tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities.”33  In other words, the Court suggested that the very animosity 
                                                                                                                          
determinism as a basis for identity-based legal protections.  See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and 
the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 567–68 
(1994) [hereinafter Politics of Biology] (denouncing efforts to ground pro-gay advocacy on the 
inconclusive and conceptually muddled science of homosexuality and advocating instead a middle 
ground between constructivist and essentialist conceptions of identity).  My own understanding of the 
choice morass is substantially influenced by Halley’s work, which eloquently documents the 
incoherence surrounding scientistic claims to immutability when the very categories organizing this 
scientific research, homosexuality and heterosexuality, remain thoroughly unstable.  See id. at 567; see, 
e.g., Carmen M. Butler, Victimhood to Agency: A Constructionist Comparison of Sexual Orientation to 
Religious Orientation, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 147, 166 (2005) (contending that “[a]dvocates who use 
essentialist theory to promote gay rights inadvertently support a static image of sexuality in general and 
a victim image of gays in particular”); Janet Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and 
After Bowers v. Hardwick,  79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1770 (1993) [hereinafter Act and Identity] (noting the 
instability of acts and identities in the Court’s focus on “homosexual sodomy” and calling upon “those 
of us who inhabit gay and lesbian identity [to] loosen our grip on these identities”); Jonathan Pickhardt, 
Note, Choose or Loose: Embracing Theories of Choice in Gay Rights Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 921 (1998) (cataloguing the strategic failure and collateral effects of “choice-denying” 
arguments for LGBT rights litigation and advocating instead a “choice-affirming” approach). 
31 Nancy Knauer makes a compelling case for the perils of embracing immutability, asserting 
provocatively that “the pro-gay insistence on immutability represents the Achilles’ heel of the 
contemporary gay political narrative.  Claims of immutability rest on a shaky factual basis, produce 
stable desexualized gay subjects with no transformative value, and they are ultimate unresponsive to 
the pro-family characterization of homosexuality as a chosen and immoral behavior.”  Nancy J. 
Knauer, Science, Identity, and the Construction of the Gay Political Narrative, 12 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 7 
(2003).  The writings of Lynne Wardle and other anti-gay conservatives amply bear out these warnings.  
See generally Wardle, supra note 20 (suggesting that homosexuality constitutes a public health menace, 
whatever its etiology).   
32 See generally Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2000) (arguing that equal protection analysis should focus on “the meaning or expressive 
content of the law or policy at issue” and whether that “meaning conflicts with the government's 
obligation to treat each person with equal concern”).  
33 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).  The relevant passage reads 
in full: 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those 
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under 
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of 
legislation. . . .  Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or racial minorities . . . ; 
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catalyzing legislation that disfavors certain groups likely yields formidable 
hurdles as well to their use of political processes to seek and achieve equal 
treatment under law. 
Out of this recognition emerged the tiers of scrutiny that now organize 
equal protection analysis, to significant consternation.34  This “more 
searching judicial inquiry” traverses different paths depending, at least in 
theory, on the likelihood that the laws under review reflect “prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities” and therefore warrant heightened 
scrutiny by courts.35  Oddly, however, efforts to illuminate and counter 
irrational prejudice frequently metamorphosed into efforts to identify the 
precise nature of the group alleging prejudice.  Odder still, courts paid 
particular attention to the criteria of group membership, specifically the 
conditions for entry and exit.  In other words, an inquiry into the nature and 
effects of prejudice succumbed to an inquiry into the nature of identity: 
voluntary or involuntary, essential or inessential? 
Viewed from this angle, heightened-scrutiny analysis took a series of 
obfuscatory detours that led courts astray from the central precepts of equal 
protection and judicial review in guarding against government-sponsored 
subordination.  Indeed, scholars have argued persuasively that the 
interpolation of immutability as a factor in equal protection analysis—
much less a requirement—was itself historically contingent and likely 
unnecessary to the effective review of discriminatory classifications.36  
Immutability first surfaced as a litigation strategy in equal protection cases 
to highlight parallels between racism and sexism (rather than race and sex) 
as irrational prejudices predicated on stereotypes and unfounded 
assumptions.  Yet it soon became an inconsistent litmus test for access to 
                                                                                                                          
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily 
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry. . . . 
Id.   
34 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (declaring racial classifications 
“immediately suspect” and “subject . . . to the most rigid scrutiny”).  See generally, e.g., Suzanne 
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004) (offering a comprehensive account 
and critique of the multi-tiered approach); id. at 527–33 (proposing a uniform alternative that would 
hew more closely to the spirit of equal protection analysis).  Korematsu, which upheld the internment 
of Japanese Americans during the Second World War, reflected the first explicit application of strict 
(although remarkably indulgent) scrutiny to a racial classification. 
35 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
36 See generally Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375 (1999) 
(challenging biological theories of race and their significance to equal protection analysis); id. at 1453 
(chronicling the litigation strategy of ACLU attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg to tether sex differences to 
biology in two early sex discrimination cases seeking heightened scrutiny for sex-based 
classifications); Nan D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 
397, 402–04 (2001) (recounting the same events); Marc R. Shapiro, Treading the Supreme Court’s 
Murky Immutability Waters, 38 GONZAGA L. REV. 409, 437–38 (2002/2003)  (lamenting the Supreme 
Court’s failure to define immutability and the extent to which the concept perpetuates discredited 
scientific theories of race). 
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heightened scrutiny.37  In Frontiero v. Richardson, one of its earliest 
decisions invalidating sex-based classifications under Equal Protection 
analysis, the Supreme Court noted that: 
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the 
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a 
particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate ‘the 
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear 
some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .’38 
This passage represents the debut of immutability in federal equal 
protection analysis.39  Its emergence as a basis on which to challenge sex 
discrimination required a series of logical leaps, since biological 
differences between the sexes had hitherto seemed like a generally valid 
rationale for legislative distinctions.40  In the context of race and other axes 
of identity, however, mere difference had become an insufficient 
justification for discriminatory treatment.  Then-attorney Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, writing on behalf of amicus ACLU in Frontiero, invoked 
immutability to analogize the mechanisms of sexism to those of racism and 
                                                                                                                          
37 See Braman, supra note 36 at 1453. 
38 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 
U.S. 164, 175 (1972)) (plurality opinion) (1973).  In Weber, the Court noted: 
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation 
of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.  But visiting this 
condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.  Moreover, imposing 
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system 
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or 
wrongdoing.  Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth, and penalizing the 
illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the 
parent. 
Weber, 406 U.S. at 175.   
39 Immutability emerged as an equal protection factor merely two years earlier in state court.  To 
my knowledge, the California Supreme Court issued the first and only judicial decision prior to 
Frontiero that invoked immutability as a basis for identifying a suspect classification.  In 1971, the 
court struck down a state law prohibiting women from tending bar.  Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 
529, 540 (Cal. 1971) (deeming sex a suspect classification warranting strict scrutiny to invalidate a 
state law excluding most women as bartenders).  
40 A few years before these arguments surfaced, the editors of the Harvard Law Review had 
pondered the peculiar skepticism accorded laws that wield racially discriminatory classifications.  Why, 
the editors wondered, should race, ethnicity and what the editors called “lineage” garner exceptional 
treatment?  “Perhaps the answer is that race and lineage are congenital and unalterable traits over which 
an individual has no control and for which he should receive neither blame nor reward. . . .  Yet these 
factors, though significant, clearly do not constitute the complete explanation for the special judicial 
treatment of suspect traits.”  The editors proceed to distinguish race, lineage and ethnic origin from 
“other congenital and unalterable characteristics such as sex or certain physical disabilities” on the 
ground that the former classifications “will usually be perceived as a stigma of inferiority and a badge 
of opprobrium.”  Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1126–27 
(1969).  Oddly, the California Supreme Court cited this discussion in Sail’er Inn while determining that 
sex, as a suspect classification based on an immutable characteristic, did warrant strict scrutiny.  Sail’er 
Inn, 485 P.2d at 540. 
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xenophobia: all biases that reify difference to justify status distinctions.41 
Although the Court’s “accident of birth” language would seem clearly 
to locate the unfairness of such an apportionment of burdens in the 
congenital origins of disfavored qualities, this paradigm does not 
necessarily rest on biological determinants.  As one scholar has 
demonstrated persuasively, the Court generally operated with a social 
rather than a biological conception of race at the time that Frontiero was 
decided,42 and its inclusion of national origin among legislative 
classifications warranting special concern affirms the primacy of social and 
cultural categories to the constitution of legally salient identities.   
The decision from which the Court drew its language of burdens and 
individual responsibility, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 
invalidated a state law disadvantaging non-marital children and privileging 
marital children with respect to inheritance rights.43  This case thus dealt 
squarely with the ultimate “accident of birth,” or illegitimacy, holding that 
the children born to unmarried parents bore no responsibility for their 
plight and hence seemed especially undeserving of the burdens with which 
discriminatory legislation saddled them.44  Yet the quality distinguishing 
these children from those with two legally recognized parents is a social 
fact with no biological significance at all; rather, it clearly bears the legacy 
of cultural norms favoring domesticated sexuality over sex outside of 
marriage.45   
What’s more, the jurisprudence of so-called illegitimacy long 
equivocated on the degree of scrutiny to be accorded laws that deploy such 
classifications.  If the “accident of birth” language seems essential to 
delineating those qualities that warrant the most stringent protection from 
the majority, then it makes little sense that the Court has wavered in its 
application of heightened scrutiny to children born outside a marriage, 
occasionally applying minimal scrutiny and other times clearly heightened 
scrutiny.46 In 1988, the Court finally identified its approach to 
                                                                                                                          
41 See Braman, supra note 36, at 1451 & n.324, 1452 (describing Ginsburg’s involvement as the 
ACLU introduced immutability to the Court in the context of sex-based classifications). 
42 See id. at 1446 (noting the Court had understood racial status to be a product of social 
institutions). 
43 See Weber, 406 U.S. at 176 (recognizing the Equal Protection Clause as a tool to invalidate 
“discriminatory laws relating to the status of birth”). 
44 See id. at 175 (disapproving of liabilities imposed on illegitimate children because they bear no 
responsibility for their births); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (describing legislation 
which seeks to punish children for actions of their parents fails as unjust). 
45 See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175–76 (“Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium 
suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down 
discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where—as in this case—the classification is justified by 
no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.”) (footnote omitted). 
46 See, e.g., Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the “Legal Orphan”: Inheritance Rights of Children 
After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REV. 125, 153–63 (2005) (detailing the evolution of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on non-marital children during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s).  
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classifications of nonmarital children as intermediate scrutiny.47   This 
trajectory suggests that government policies burdening children for the 
circumstances of their birth over which they have no control may 
epitomize unfairness, but they have not elicited the degree of judicial 
concern associated with certain other governmental distinctions.   
Most post-Frontiero cases contemplating heightened scrutiny directed 
focus toward the traits that characterize members of a group disadvantaged 
under discriminatory legislation, elaborating those qualities of group 
identity that give rise to a suspicion of animus.  For example, in Lyng v. 
Castillo, the Court reversed a lower court ruling applying strict scrutiny to 
a provision of the federal Food Stamp Act that imposed different eligibility 
requirements for close relatives—specifically parents, children, and 
siblings—and distant relatives or unrelated cohabitants.  Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, declared that “[c]lose relatives are not a ‘suspect’ 
or ‘quasi-suspect’ class.  As a historical matter, they have not been 
subjected to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they 
are not a minority or politically powerless.”48  If such characteristics mark 
a group, then the motive for singling that group out may well be invidious, 
bur these qualities have no necessary relationship to de jure discrimination.  
And immutability stands as only one possible feature of group identity that 
might suggest unjust treatment, a feature assembled with adjectives that, 
read together, signal the likelihood that a particular class has garnered 
recognition and disapprobation.  Most disturbing of all, many courts have 
missed the disjunctive locution altogether, either eliding the terms 
“obvious” and “distinguishing” while citing only “immutability,” or oddly 
conflating all three as mandating an inquiry into the voluntary or 
involuntary nature of class membership.49   
Scholars argued convincingly in the 1990s that courts should discard 
immutability as a requirement for heightened scrutiny, compiling instances 
where courts already had done so.50  Its persistence as a litmus test for 
                                                                                                                          
47 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“Between these extremes of rational basis review 
and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to 
discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”). 
48 Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that cohabitating relatives presumed under 
federal food stamp program to constitute a single household do not garner heightened scrutiny, which 
obtains when members of the class “exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that 
define them as a discrete group”); see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602–03 (1987) (quoting 
Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638).   
49 See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (“To qualify as a suspect 
class for purposes of an equal protection analysis, the class must . . . have as the characteristic defining 
the class an obvious, immutable trait that frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute 
to society . . . .”). 
50 After persuasively debunking the rationales for protecting immutable groups over immutable 
groups that identify fixed qualities as the greatest source of disability, Professor Kenji Yoshino 
contended in 1998 that “[i]t is thus unsurprising that courts have begun to withdraw the immutability 
 
 1512 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1495 
exacting judicial review of sexual orientation discrimination, however, 
seems to belie this account of obsolescence.51  Instead, immutability 
arguments have regained salience in gay rights litigation and scholarship.52  
Some courts construe immutability as a central factor in equal protection 
analysis, deeming the failure to prove it an effective bar to heightened 
protection for gay men and lesbians; other courts and commentators have 
recast the immutability inquiry as a discussion about the centrality of 
sexual orientation to personal identity.  In the next Part, I briefly survey 
such arguments, focusing in particular on the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
salutary contribution to this woefully muddled jurisprudence. 
III.  KERRIGAN AND THE NEW IMMUTABILITY 
With few exceptions, claims embracing immutability proved a losing 
strategy in gay rights litigation until cases began changing the object and 
nature of the immutability inquiry.  Most courts evaluating equal 
protection challenges to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
the 1980s and 1990s declined to apply heightened scrutiny, often noting 
specifically that homosexuality fails the immutability prong.  They rejected 
arguments for sexual orientation as a suspect classification and for the 
application of strict or intermediate scrutiny on the ground that 
homosexuality lacks the properties of a true identity.  These cases 
understood sexual orientation to describe a collection of preferences, 
                                                                                                                          
factor and that recent academic commentary seems univocal in calling for its retirement even as a 
factor.”  Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 518 (1998) (citations omitted); see also id. at 510 
(lamenting the tolls exacted by assimilationist pressures to abandon putatively mutable traits).  Yoshino 
drew on the work of prominent scholars who had challenged the legitimacy and continued relevance of 
immutability to sexual orientation discrimination.  See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 
106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2323–24 (1997) (characterizing immutability as neither necessary nor sufficient 
because status depends on a stable social meaning); Halley, Politics of Biology, supra note 30, at 507–
16 (arguing that courts privilege political vulnerability over immutability and noting the “lackluster 
track record” of the immutability argument); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 531, 550 (1992) (arguing that the question of immutability is less important than the question 
of coercion). 
51 In 1996, Professor Chai Feldblum noted that, despite her misgivings about the approach, she 
continued to invoke immutability in briefs filed on behalf of LGBT groups.  See Chai R. Feldblum, 
Sexual Orientation, Morality and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 277–79 n.189 
(1996); see also William Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group 
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1639–44 (1997) (describing 
the controversy among pro-gay litigators over advancing arguments from immutability). 
52 Scholars such as Marcosson have taken up Halley’s challenge to bridge the gulf between 
essentialist and constructivist accounts of gay, lesbian and bisexual identity by offering a version of 
immutability predicated on the idea that “social and cultural influences shape individual identity” in 
powerful ways.  Marcosson, supra note 29, at 650.  Marcosson contends that, “[p]roperly understood 
and argued, immutability has resonance both within and outside the legal sphere, and can be of 
particularly great force in winning the fight for sexual and gender minorities.”  Id. at 649.  Marcosson’s 
approach seems to have won the day in recent marriage-equality decisions issuing from California, 
Connecticut and Iowa.   
 2009] CHANGING THE IMMUTABLE 1513 
propensities, behaviors, or attractions that have little or nothing in common 
with group identities based on race, ethnicity, sex, or any of the other 
“accidents of birth.”53  Many of these courts relied on Bowers v. Hardwick 
to dismiss the notion that a class of persons defined by their potentially 
criminal conduct might receive heightened judicial solicitude.54 
But heresy began brewing in isolated opinions arguing for a broader 
conception of immutability.  The first and most extensive analysis of 
heightened scrutiny for sexual-orientation discrimination appeared in 
Judge Norris’s lengthy concurrence in Watkins v. United States Army.55    
Judge Norris maintained that, in reviewing a model soldier’s discharge 
predicated solely on his admission of homosexuality, the Ninth Circuit 
should apply strict scrutiny to strike down the military’s policy of 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.56  He distinguished 
Bowers as a due process holding with no bearing on equal protection 
analysis57 and disputed the claim that the Supreme Court’s immutability 
jurisprudence required an inability to change one’s distinguishing traits.58   
                                                                                                                          
53 See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 
(6th Cir. 1995) (“Those persons who fall within the orbit of legislation concerning sexual orientation 
are so affected not because of their orientation but rather by their conduct which identifies them as 
homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual.”).  Although the Supreme Court vacated and remanded this case 
for reconsideration in light of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Sixth Circuit affirmed its 
earlier decision not to apply heightened scrutiny to legislation targeting sexual orientation and upheld 
the discriminatory policy once again.  Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 128 
F.3d 289, 301 (6th Cir.1997); see, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance 
Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is 
behavioral and hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender or alienage . . . .”); 
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Members of recognized suspect or 
quasi-suspect classes, e.g., blacks or women, exhibit immutable characteristics, whereas homosexuality 
is primarily behavioral in nature.”); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denying 
“suspect class status for practicing homosexuals” because “[i]t would be quite anomalous, on its face, 
to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict 
scrutiny under the equal protection clause”); Rich v. Sec’y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 
1984) (“A classification based on one’s choice of sexual partners is not suspect.”); cf. Thomasson v. 
Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 939 (4th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing the “propensity” toward homosexuality targeted 
by the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy from “a predetermined and immutable characteristic like 
race or sex” because the former reflects “an inclination” to engage in certain conduct). 
54 See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (“If homosexual conduct 
may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.”); Padula, 822 F.2d 
at 103 (“We therefore think the courts’ reasoning in Hardwick and Dronenburg forecloses appellant’s 
efforts to gain suspect class status for practicing homosexuals.  It would be quite anomolous, on its 
face, to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of 
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.”).  
55 See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711–28 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., 
concurring). 
56 Id. at 711, 728. 
57 Id. at 716–17. 
58 Id. at 726.  Judge Norris advocated “[r]eading the case law in a more capacious manner, [such 
that] ‘immutability’ may describe those traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would be 
abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that 
change might be physically.”  Id.  
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In 1998, an Oregon appellate court found that a state university policy 
denying insurance benefits to same-sex couples while granting them to 
married heterosexual couples violated the state’s constitutional guarantee 
of equality with respect to the privileges and immunities of citizenship.  It 
ruled in the process that the lesbian plaintiffs belonged to a suspect class.  
The opinion noted that Oregon courts had deemed suspect certain classes 
defined by mutable characteristics such as religious affiliation and 
alienage, and by potentially alterable ones such as gender.  In the court’s 
reading of relevant state law, “immutability—in the sense of inability to 
alter or change—is not necessary” for suspect class definition.  Indeed, this 
inquiry properly focuses on not “the immutability of the common, class-
defining characteristics, but instead the fact that such characteristics are 
historically regarded as defining distinct, socially-recognized groups that 
have been the subject of adverse social or political stereotyping or 
prejudice.”59  Such a shift may seem subtle, but its impact should not be 
understated.  A focus on the particular traits that characterize members of a 
disparaged group, including the origins and malleability of those traits, 
yields to scrutiny of their use by the majority as a basis for adverse 
treatment.60    
More recently, a number of state courts have evaluated exclusionary 
marriage policies as a matter of sexual orientation discrimination, some 
addressing the question of immutability and others deciding the issues 
without particular attention to the nature of gay, lesbian and bisexual 
identity.61  Among the courts that have evaluated access to marriage as an 
equal protection matter, those in California, Connecticut, and now Iowa 
ruled in favor of heightened scrutiny for legal classifications based on 
sexual orientation.62  The high courts of New York, Maryland, and 
                                                                                                                          
59 See Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 446–48 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) 
(holding that the discriminatory policy violated Ore. Const. Art. I, § 20). 
60 While this move corresponds to a shift in emphasis from the nature of class identity, especially 
its ontological groundings, to the nature of discrimination, it should not be confused with what scholars 
have lamented as the “class to classification shift” characterizing the Supreme Court’s affirmative 
action jurisprudence.  In the affirmative action context, the Court demonstrated an increasing 
unwillingness to distinguish between racial classifications that function to subordinate historically 
disadvantaged groups and such classifications that function to protect or even prioritize such groups.  
See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”: The Inversion of 
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 639 (2003); 
id. at 692–93 (proposing an antisubordination approach to equal protection that would “look[] toward 
ending only those governmental practices that reinforce caste”).   
61 Goodridge exemplifies this latter approach, focusing on the nature of the right restricted—
marriage—rather than on the nature of the class excluded.  See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 954–58 (Mass. 2003).  A court’s analysis is of course circumscribed, at least in part, by the 
arguments before it; among the marriage cases, the parties’ arguments have emphasized due process 
considerations, equal protection challenges, or both. 
62 See generally In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, 2009 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 31 (Iowa 
Apr. 3, 2009).   
 2009] CHANGING THE IMMUTABLE 1515 
Washington State, on the other hand, found that gay men and lesbians as a 
class, and sexual orientation as a classification, fail the test for heightened 
scrutiny; hence legislation affecting their interests or allotting state benefits 
on the basis of heterosexual orientation warrants only rational basis 
review.63   
Recent cases construing immutability as a strict requirement for 
heightened scrutiny tend to hold that claims to such scrutiny for sexual 
orientation classifications fail not because homosexuality describes mere 
conduct or inclination, but because insufficient evidence exists to resolve 
the question whether sexual orientation is static and predetermined or fluid 
and volitional.  For example, in Conaway v. Deane, which applied rational 
basis review to a marriage statute limiting marriage to different-sex 
couples, the Maryland Court of Appeals invoked immutability as a feature 
of suspect and quasi-suspect classifications even though the parties had not 
addressed immutability in their briefs.64  Citing to Frontiero and other 
federal cases, the court asserted confidently that “[t]he term ‘immutability’ 
defines a human characteristic that is determined ‘solely by the accident of 
birth,’ or that the possessor is ‘powerless to escape or set aside.’”65  
Because “the scientific and sociological evidence currently available to the 
public” remains equivocal on the etiology of sexual orientation and its 
fixity, the court declared itself “unable to take judicial notice that gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual persons display readily-recognizable, immutable 
characteristics that define the group” for the purpose of heightened 
scrutiny.66  In “the absence of some generally accepted scientific 
conclusion identifying homosexuality as an immutable characteristic,” no 
suspect or quasi-suspect classification obtained.67 
In a case decided shortly before Conaway, the Washington Supreme 
Court applied rational basis review to uphold a state law restricting 
marriage to different-sex couples after finding that gay and lesbian persons 
                                                                                                                          
63 New York’s Court of Appeals found specifically that gay men and lesbians excluded from 
marriage to their partners do not belong to a suspect or quasi-suspect class with respect to the 
legislation at issue because their distinguishing characteristics are relevant to the state’s interests in 
defining marriage and family.  The majority defined the paramount characteristic as a “preference for 
the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the birth of children . . . .”  Hernandez v. Robles, 855 
N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006); see also id. (“Those who prefer relationships with people of the opposite sex 
and those who prefer relationships with people of the same sex are not treated alike, since only 
opposite-sex relationships may gain the status and benefits associated with marriage.”). 
64 See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 615 n.57 (Md. 2007) (contemplating the scientific 
evidence supporting the immutability of sexual orientation and the critiques of that evidence, even 
though the court notes that no party has raised the issue in its briefs, and concluding that “there does 
not appear to be a consensus yet among ‘experts’ as to the origin of an individual’s sexual 
orientation”). 
65 Id. at 614.  
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 616. 
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do not qualify for heightened scrutiny.68  Enumerating the criteria for 
suspect-class status, the court noted that “the class must have suffered a 
history of discrimination, have as the characteristic defining the class an 
obvious, immutable trait that frequently bears no relation to ability to 
perform or contribute to society, and show that it is a minority or 
politically powerless class.”69  Note the reformulation of the Lyng factors 
here: “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics” 70 become “an 
obvious, immutable trait.”  Under this stringent requirement, a failure to 
establish the immutability of homosexuality becomes a disqualification for 
heightened scrutiny: 
The plaintiffs do not cite other authority or any secondary 
authority or studies in support of the conclusion that 
homosexuality is an immutable characteristic.  They focus 
instead on the lack of any relation between homosexuality 
and ability to perform or contribute to society.  But plaintiffs 
must make a showing of immutability, and they have not 
done so in this case.71   
The Andersen court thus takes immutability to be a sine qua non of 
heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis. 
Since Andersen and Conaway, however, challenges to marriage 
discrimination have succeeded in winning heightened scrutiny of 
classifications based on sexual orientation.  Before Kerrigan, the 
California Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to legislation relegating 
gay couples to domestic partnership while reserving civil marriage for 
straight couples.  In striking down this distinction, the court adopted an 
understanding of immutability as essential to self-definition.72  Most 
recently, in Varnum v. Brien, the Iowa Supreme Court looked to California 
and Connecticut’s marriage decisions to hold unanimously that a state ban 
on same-sex marriage violated the state constitution, evaluating the 
exclusion of gay and lesbian couples under heightened scrutiny.73  This 
opinion marked the third in a year to find that sexual orientation satisfied 
the immutability inquiry because of its centrality to individual identity, 
                                                                                                                          
68 See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006).   
69 Id.  
70 See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. at 638. 
71 Id.  
72 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442–43 (“Because a person's sexual orientation is so 
integral an aspect of one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or 
her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.”).  The California court’s approach to 
the question of immutability echoes that of the 9th Circuit in Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 
1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Sexual orientation and sexual identity . . . are so fundamental to one’s 
identity that a person should not be required to abandon them.”).  
73 See Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, 2009 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 31, at *7 (Iowa Apr. 3, 2009) 
(holding that the Iowa marriage statute violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution). 
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holding that “the trait defining the burdened class” need not be “absolutely 
impervious to change.”74  While the California and Iowa decisions obviate 
the problem of etiology, rendering scientific certainty on the origins of 
homosexuality irrelevant, neither departs fully from the framework that 
denies scrutiny to discriminatory policies targeting putatively volitional 
qualities.  Varnum, in particular, seems to accept this framework as proper, 
explaining that immutability implicates “the ability of the individual to 
change the characteristic responsible for the discrimination.  This aspect of 
immutability may separate truly victimized individuals from those who 
have invited discrimination by changing themselves so as to be identified 
with the group.”75  In other words, the immutability inquiry purports to 
exempt victims from blame, while in fact carving out a narrow category of 
“true” victims and reserving blame for voluntary victims.  Such a 
distinction is both unfortunate and unnecessary.76   
I noted above that some courts construe immutability as a bar to 
heightened protection for gay men and lesbians, while others undertake an 
analysis of immutability by emphasizing the centrality of sexual 
orientation to personal identity.  Although the Kerrigan decision 
corresponds generally to this latter category, its brief analysis of the 
immutability issue dramatically alters its scope and implications.  The 
court’s discussion of the immutability factor embarks on a deceptively 
modest track, one that, when read carefully, augers a major discursive 
shift:  
A third factor that courts have considered in determining 
whether the members of a class are entitled to heightened 
protection for equal protection purposes is whether the 
attribute or characteristic that distinguishes them is 
immutable or otherwise beyond their control.  Of course, the 
characteristic that distinguishes gay persons from others and 
qualifies them for recognition as a distinct and discrete group 
is the characteristic that historically has resulted in their 
social and legal ostracism, namely, their attraction to persons 
of the same sex.77  
Far from stating the obvious as its “of course” would suggest, this gloss on 
the significance of the distinguishing characteristic that separates gays 
from straights offers a subtle corrective to existing analyses, with their 
                                                                                                                          
74 Id. at *73.  
75 Id. at *75.  
76 See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation, supra note 29, at 1303 (“Such 
instances evoke abhorrence not because the state is burdening the individual for an ‘immutable’ 
characteristic, but rather because it is burdening the individual’s choice to be different.”). 
77 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 436 (Conn. 2008) (citation omitted). 
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misguided inquiry into the causes and permanence of sexual orientation.  
In the discussion that follows, the Kerrigan court proceeds persuasively to 
discount the significance of immutability to heightened scrutiny, and to 
read its scope broadly—consistent with Judge Norris’s concurrence, the 
Tanner court, and the two recent opinions out of California and Iowa—to 
implicate characteristics central to personal identity, if not either genetic in 
origin or entirely impervious to change.78  But the passage above offers yet 
another reading of immutability, one that turns not on the significance of 
individual self-definition or the question of volition, but rather on the 
persistence of “social and legal ostracism” as the relevant aspect of group 
definition.     
On the one hand, then, Justice Palmer’s majority opinion falls prey to 
the same analytic oversight that plagues the jurisprudence of immutability, 
setting up its discussion of the relevant factors for according suspect or 
quasi-suspect status to a class by quoting the language from Lyng and then 
eliding two of the three enumerated criteria.  It identifies as one of two 
additional considerations whether “the characteristic that defines the 
members of the class as a discrete group is immutable or otherwise not 
within their control,”79 and then cites as support the passage from Lyng 
announcing a test for suspect status in determinations whether “members 
of the class ‘exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics 
that define them as a discrete group.’”80  Again, this cluster of adjectives 
collapses into one: “immutable,” with its emphasis on the permanent and 
involuntary nature of defining qualities.   
On the other hand, the emphasis on the “social and legal ostracism” of 
gay men, lesbians and bisexuals, both here and throughout the opinion, 
offers a welcome antidote to the misplaced focus on group identity and 
membership that the immutability jurisprudence has invited.  This 
conception of identity underscores its social and legal dimensions rather 
than stressing the significance of internal self or group-definition.  In other 
words, it reminds us that equal protection analysis is centrally concerned 
with status—not in the sense of one’s stable identity, but in the sense of 
one’s access to the rights and protections afforded the majority.81  
Throughout the opinion, Kerrigan eloquently recounts the history of de 
                                                                                                                          
78 Id. at 438 (“In view of the central role that sexual orientation plays in a person’s fundamental 
right to self-determination, we fully agree with the plaintiffs that their sexual orientation represents the 
kind of distinguishing characteristic that defines them as a discrete group for purposes of determining 
whether that group should be afforded heightened protection under the equal protection provisions of 
the state constitution.”). 
79 Id. at 426. 
80 Id. (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (2006)).   
81 In his recent book Racial Culture, Professor Richard Ford analyzed the immutability question 
in terms of ascriptive status: “Once a status is ascribed, it is ‘immutable’ in the pragmatic sense that the 
individual cannot readily alter it.  This is the sense in which immutability is relevant to anti-
discrimination law.”  RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 103 (2005). 
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facto and de jure ostracism that has defined the gay community in the 
United States.82  This history and the inferior status that attends pervasive 
cultural norms around homosexuality offer ample grounds for satisfying 
the new immutability inquiry.83  
IV.  CHOOSING SELF-DETERMINATION  
Let us return to the vexed issue of choice in discussions of sexual 
orientation.  Its political currency notwithstanding, the question of whether 
homosexuality is chosen or determined at birth need not play a role in 
equal protection jurisprudence.  But what about in public debate?  
Although scholars in a variety of disciplines have challenged biological 
immutability as a fruitless or even dangerous avenue of inquiry,84 the 
biological approach to sexual orientation has taken hold in popular culture.  
Many commentators have noted a strange throwback to taxonomical 
discourses of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: theories of 
homosexuality that posited a third sex, the separate identity of “invert,” or 
a pathology that differed from mere sinful or criminal behavior.85  This 
trope of congenital homosexuality—in contrast to theories of acquired or 
mutable homosexuality—boasts a long history in Western culture, one that 
scholars have recounted extensively.  In most of its nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century elaborations, the figure of “the homosexual” constituted 
a physiological and psychological anomaly whose mystery could be 
deciphered only by the medically trained investigator.   
Historians of science and sexuality have traced the two primary strains 
                                                                                                                          
82 See in particular Kerrigan’s lengthy discussions of the political powerlessness and history of 
discrimination afflicting gay persons.  Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431–34 
(Conn. 2008). 
83 The court draws heavily from Justice Thurgood Marshall’s concurring and dissenting opinion 
in Cleburne v. Cleburne Learning Center, Inc., where he wrote:  
The discreteness and insularity warranting a “more searching judicial inquiry” . . 
. must therefore be viewed from a social and cultural perspective as well as a 
political one.  To this task judges are well suited, for the lessons of history and 
experience are surely the best guide as to when, and with respect to what interests, 
society is likely to stigmatize individuals as members of an inferior caste or view 
them as not belonging to the community.  Because prejudice spawns prejudice, and 
stereotypes produce limitations that confirm the stereotype on which they are based, 
a history of unequal treatment requires sensitivity to the prospect that its vestiges 
endure.  In separating those groups that are discrete and insular from those that are 
not, as in many important legal distinctions, “a page of history is worth a volume of 
logic.” 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 429–30 n.22 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Learning Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 
472–73 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citation 
omitted)).   
84 For an overview of this argument, see generally STEIN, supra note 28; TERRY, supra note 28; 
Halley, supra note 30; Knauer, supra note 31; Yoshino, supra note 50. 
85 See, e.g., Knauer, supra note 31, at 10 (“The science of immutability that undergirds the 
contemporary gay political narrative belongs to a longstanding tradition that attempts to explain or 
define the homosexual condition in scientific terms.”). 
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of investigative inquiries into homosexuality that reigned through most of 
the twentieth century, both following from the work of late nineteenth-
century sexologists: one focused on the particular psychical and 
physiological qualities of gay men and lesbians, and the other interested 
more broadly in sex practices and erotic desires across broad swaths of the 
population.86  For the majority of the twentieth century, scientific interest 
in homosexuality coalesced largely around its allegedly 
psychopathological dimensions; indeed, until its elimination from the DSM 
in 1973, homosexuality constituted a psychic malady of considerable 
moment.87  
The embrace of immutability within LGBT communities reflects a 
notable shift: where these communities once organized around a 
commitment to sexual freedom and rejection of compulsory 
heterosexuality, they began to self-define according to a shared essence.  A 
model of sexual orientation predicated on innate but benign differences 
offered itself as an alternative to the view of gay men, lesbians, and 
bisexuals as mentally ill; instead, they could be understood as a distinct 
and natural species of person.  Whereas Bowers construed homosexuals as 
both the sum of their sodomitical acts and the reason such acts are despised 
and immoral,88 the mainstreaming of LGBT politics evident in Lawrence 
and the marriage litigation has mobilized the argument that gays are just 
like straights, only (benignly) different.89   
Arguments around choice and determinism have evolved dialectically.  
As I indicated above, religious conservatives seized upon choice to counter 
claims that homosexuality is organic and that gay persons deserve 
tolerance because their identity reflects a harmless and involuntary 
difference.  In response, mainstream LGBT organizations and advocates 
reaffirmed the we-can’t-help-it logic in order to avert the blame attached to 
                                                                                                                          
86 These two strains correspond to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s minoritizing and universalizing 
models of homosexuality: “To be gay, or to be potentially classifiable as gay . . . is to come under the 
radically overlapping aegises of a universalizing discourse of acts or bonds and at the same time of a 
minoritizing discourse of kinds of persons.”  SEDGWICK, supra note 24, at 54. 
87 See generally JENNIFER TERRY, AN AMERICAN OBSESSION: SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND 
HOMOSEXUALITY IN MODERN SOCIETY passim (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999); SCIENCES AND 
HOMOSEXUALITIES passim (Vernon A. Rosario ed., Routledge 1997). 
88 See, e.g., Halley, Act and Identity, supra note 30, at 1770.  
89 See generally Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1619–
32 (2004) (identifying the like-straight logic of Lawrence, which grants liberty protections to gay 
people to the extent they resemble idealized straight people); Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s 
Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1399–1400 (2005) (identifying the like-straight logic of Goodridge and 
lamenting the strategic decision to promote an “immaculate conception of gay and lesbian identities” in 
marriage litigation); see also Courtney Megan Cahill, “If Sex Offenders Can Marry, Then Why Not 
Gays and Lesbians?”: An Essay on the Progressive Comparative Argument, 55 BUFFALO L. REV. 777, 
796–99 (critiquing the like-straight logic of recent gay rights litigation). 
 2009] CHANGING THE IMMUTABLE 1521 
willful deviance and subversion of community norms.90  And marriage as 
the central, normalizing goal of the gay rights movement from mid-1990s 
on has taken the just-like-you-only-different argument to a new level.  
These days, few proponents of same-sex marriage predicate their strongest 
claims to access for gay and lesbian couples on the argument that this 
bundle of state-sponsored benefits should be broadly available to diverse 
family forms.  Much less do they advocate that marriage be evacuated of 
its disciplinary force to privilege conforming subjects over nonconforming 
ones.  Instead, their rhetoric emphasizes the extent to which same-sex 
couples embrace all the norms of marital heterosexuality save the one that 
their essential nature disallows.91  
Not only is the “we-can’t-help-it” approach unpalatable, but the ceding 
of choice to opponents of gay rights is misguided on other grounds.  
Historians of science, queer theorists, and other scholars have challenged 
the new sexual orientation research and the scientistic turn in LGBT rights 
arguments, claiming that the studies themselves suffer from conceptual 
flaws.  They contend that those who wield such research to argue for legal 
protection and popular acceptance ignore the dangers of eugenics and the 
use of scientific research in the past to isolate and pathologize gay men and 
lesbians.92  Moreover, choice remains central to liberal democratic ideals 
of self and culture, and the historic treatment of homosexuality cautions 
against embracing compulsion over volition.  As I have documented 
elsewhere, the psychiatric turn in medico-legal reasoning cast 
homosexuality as a state of diminished will and impaired self-governance.  
Medico-legal discourse figured “the homosexual” as a subject incapable of 
exercising self-restraint and self-determination.93  Hence models of 
identity that posit sexual orientation as an innate condition outside of 
human agency, despite their apparent expediency in arguments for 
                                                                                                                          
90 A recent column in Slate magazine reported that the much-remarked racial disparities in 
support for California’s Proposition 8, the constitutional amendment overriding the California Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in the Marriage Cases, derived primarily from different views among black 
and white voters about the immutability of sexual orientation.  
The mutability question is hardly academic.  It has been driving public opinion 
toward gay rights for decades. . . .  In Pew and Gallup surveys, respondents’ 
positions on mutability overwhelmingly predict their positions on gay marriage and 
homosexuality’s acceptability.  Pew puts the equation bluntly: ‘Belief that 
homosexuality is immutable [is] associated with positive opinions about gays and 
lesbians even more strongly than education, personal acquaintance with a 
homosexual, or general ideological beliefs.’   
William Saletan, Original Sin: Blacks, Gays and Immutability, SLATE, Nov. 13 2008, available at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2204534/.   
91 See generally MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE 
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (2000).    
92 See generally, NANCY ORDOVER, AMERICAN EUGENICS: RACE, QUEER ANATOMY, AND THE 
SCIENCE OF NATIONALISM (2003). 
93 See Susan R. Schmeiser, The Ungovernable Citizen: Psychopathy, Sexuality, and the Rise of 
Medico-Legal Reasoning, 20 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 163, 169–71 (2008).   
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equality, resonate strongly with views of homosexuality as incompatible 
with self-control and therefore full democratic citizenship. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In a dialogue with philosophers Ian Hacking and Martha Nussbaum 
upon the publication his book The Mismeasure of Desire: The Science, 
Theory and Ethics of Sexual Orientation, Ed Stein addressed their concern 
that his anti-essentialist position on homosexuality might undermine his 
ability “to convince people that sexual orientations are unchosen and 
unchangeable.”94 Eschewing this approach altogether, Stein instead 
maintained that:  
[A] more promising and important project would be to try to 
convince them that a person’s sexual orientation is not 
something one should want to change.  Rather than trying to 
convince people that sexual orientations are immutable, I 
would prefer to try to convince them that we should change 
the legal and social norms regarding lesbians, gay men, 
bisexuals and others whose sexual desires make them social 
pariahs.95   
The jurisprudence of equal protection offers a perfect forum for such 
persuasion, at least in theory.  In practice, doctrines of immutability have, 
until recently, frustrated efforts to combat systematic discrimination 
against sexual minorities.  While I contend that these doctrines reflect a 
muddled and often misguided jurisprudence, the conception of 
immutability that Kerrigan represents might indeed prove germane to the 
project Stein outlines here.  Kerrigan situates immutability as an effect, 
rather than a cause, of discrimination—capturing the inalterable status of 
social pariah that results from a history of ostracism and censure.  Legal 
reform might indeed change the immutable.    
 
 
                                                                                                                          
94 Edward Stein, Reply to Martha Nussbaum and Ian Hacking, 21 LAW & PHILOS. 349, 352 
(2002). 
95 Id. 
